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Formal Bargaining in the Prison:. 
In Search of A New Organizational Model 
by A. F. Rutherford 
A. F. Rutherford is Deputy Governor of Everthorpe 
Borstal, East Yorkshire, England, Harkness Fellow of 
the Commonwealth Fund of New York at the University of 
California (Santa Barbara) and the Yale Law School. An 
earlier version of this paper was ,ead at the Yale Law 
School in April 1970. 
In the last few years it has become somewhat 
unfashionable to be associated with the problems of 
prison organization. The zealous optimism of those 
earlier generations which drew up plans for model 
prisons would be hard to find today. In addition to the 
increased awareness of the complex organizational 
issues involved there is a widespread unease about 
incarcertaion in both mental health and criminal jus-
tice systems. Reflected in this unease is a growing 
dismay concerning post-discharge behaviour combined 
with a concern about the impact of the experience of 
incarceration upon the individual's self-definition 
and upon his role in society. Goffman'sAsylums, 1 
appearing in 1961, found an immediate reception. The 
book became part of a trend, especially in the United 
States, that led to a view of the criminal justice and 
social welfare apparatus not as a counter to deviance 
but as part of the problem, if not its very basis. Of 
greater practical significance in current challenges to 
the legitimacy of imprisonment is imprisonment's very 
high cost. The success of the California probation 
subsidy scheme in reducing committal rates and closing 
penal institutions has depended on considerable politi-
cal support for the savings in State expenditure that 
the scheme has produced. Despite these developments 
it would appear that the prison will remain a 
significant part of the social control apparatus of 
most countries for many years to come. 
While acknowledging the importance of finding 
alternatives to imprisonment, it is also essential 
that the task of developing more appropriate organi-
zational models is not neglected. Prison organizations 
have been remarkably inflexible in developing struc-
tures suited to the resolution of conflict and to the 
goal of inmate betterment. It is the argument of this 
paper that the traditional model, the Caste-Prescriptive 
Prison, is in need of radical change. Its structure 
has not been much affected by the arrival of the treat-
ment ideology, and the role position of the inmate has 
remained that of the passive and subordinate recipient. 
Attempts to develop an alternative model, based upon 
milieu therapy, will be reviewed, some suggestive leads 
will be pursued, and finally the outline of a model, 
based upon formal bargaining, will be presented. 
The Caste-Prescriptive Model 
This model characterizes the bureaucratic and 
mechanistic prison within which staff and inmate 
behaviour is subject to a large number of rules. There 
is a sharply defined staff hierarchy, and all staff 
enjoy an echelon authority over those in the lowest · 
caste group - the inmates. 
The general goals of the prison are control, 
maintenance and treatment. Control refers to all those 
activities that hold the prisoner in a manner consis- 5 
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tent with the limitations set by groups within the 
environment. In its extreme form control implies 
placing the inmate in a position where his actions 
and attitudes can be disregarded. Maintenance refers to 
all those activities concerned with getting the organ-
ization through the day. Treatment (or to use a less 
prescriptive term, inmate betterment) has to do with 
activities that are intended to reduce the chances of 
recidivism on discharge. It is a central argument of 
this paper that the failure of viable treatment 
approaches to emerge is a consequence of the very 
organizational context within which they have been 
tried. 
The control goal dominates prison organization 
because: 
a) the various punitive goals that imprisonment 
serves are merged into the control structure; 
b) prison administrators tend to be sensitive to 
public opinion and this leads to "institutional 
prudence", 2 
c) control and maintenance goals involve present 
rather than future events, they are more visible and 
their effects easier to measure than the effects of 
treatment; 
d) the control goals reflect the absence of trust of 
the inmate group by the staff. The inmate's record of 
offending is often assumed to be evidence of a general 
untrustworthiness, and his reported failures cast doubt 
upon his ability to make wise decisions. As in other 
caste structured social systems there is a widespread 
fear by staff of being "conned" by inmates. One 
reformatory administrator warned his new staff in these 
terms: 
"As soon as you think a boy's acting nice and shouldn't be 
in here, watch out. That should be the warning. Then you 
will know· you will have trouble. That nice little boy will 
be the one: to give you all the trouble when you're not 
looking."3 
The control goal is often equated with the· denial 
or reduction of inmate initiatives. McCleery writes 
that control rests upon the ruling class definition of 
the roles of ruler and ruled and that "effective 
denial of freedom involves control over perception of 
such opportunities to act as inevitably exist, control 
over the means and instruments of action, control over 
the premises of action and control over the will to 
act."4 This implies a monotonous routine within 
which the inmate is expected to fit and a considerable 
amount of monitoring by staff to ensure that the 
routine is adhered to. McCleery sums it up: 
''The heart of custodial controls in traditional prisons lies 
in the regimentation, routines and rituals of domination 
which bend the subjects into a posture of silent awe and 
unthinking acceptance."5 
Supporting these routines and rituals is an enormous 
range of control technologies including placement 
within a segregation unit and transfer to another 
prison. 
The function of caste as a control device within 
specific social systems is widely reported. 6 
Humility and lack of direct demands are the expected 
behaviour patterns of low caste people in these social 
sy~tems. A caste system also tightly controls members 
of the high caste in that if they allow members of the 
low caste to forget their place they would themselves 
become the target. These and other features of a caste 
system are found within most prisons. A further charac-
teristic is the practice of staff and inmates stereo-
typing each other as inferior and childish. Cressey 
has argued that this serves to minimize staff decision-
making about inmate conduct for "if guards are 
inferior inmates will not readily approach them with 
requests that require decision-making, and if offenders 
are inferior, thl!Y do not deserve the privilege which 
special decision-making would involve." 7 He goes on 
to suggest that staff have few personal skills for 
"their duty in the organization is primarily one of 
being present, and by their presence symbolizing a 
show of force." 8 In a situation in which their own 
autonomy is low it is expected that staff will focus on 
the minimization of inmate initiative. In addition 
they may well consider that they have sacrificed 
much in the way of personal autonomy in exchange for 
security by joining a prison service, and that inmates 
have put aside any claim to autonomy by becoming 
involved in crime. 9 
The divisions within the lower caste structure -
the informal inmate social system - has been the most 
researched aspect of prison organization. The research 
was provoked by a debate as to whether the inmate 
culture is imported or whether it represents a func-
tional response to the features of imprisonment. Early 
studies, such as Donald Clemmer's classic The Prison 
Community lO which was based on fieldwork under-
taken in the early I 930s, took a rather eclectic 
position. With the revival of sociological interest in 
the prison in the early 1950s (in part a result of a 
wave of prison riots across the United States) the 
functional explanation was stressed in most of the 
reported studies. 11 The functional explanation 
with its focus on the various adaptations to what 
Sykes called "the pains of imprisonment" was soon 
to come under challenge from those who stressed the 
importance of features that were imported into the 
prison from the environment. A key paper by Irwin 
and Cressey prepared the way for empirical research 
results, in particular from the Scandinavian Prison 
Study. 12 Contemporary studies are more inclined to 
lay stress on the inmate's own perception of his 
situation. Stanton Wheeler, for example, has argued 
that the prisoner is concerned with issues affecting 
his identity on discharge rather than what it is 
within the institutional setting. 
"It is the social definition of the prison in society, 
rather than the social status of the inmate within· the prison, 
that appears to be most relevant for the future life and 
career of prison inmates." 3 
The focus of John Irwin's latest study is the criminal 
career of which imprisonment forms only a part. 14 
There is certainly no general finding by researchers 
of the inmate solidarity in opposition to prison 
authorities that those with a functional explanation 
were inclined to take for granted. In his study of a 
psychiatric prison in Norway, Thomas Mathiesen found 
instead an individual inmate response which he calls 
censoriousness, the disparaging of staff for falling 
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below their own standards. 15 A recently published 
study of a medium security prison in California ex-
plains the absence of inmate solidarity in part as a 
function of classification and transfer procedures 
within a large department of corrections and perhaps 
also as a function of a large-scale use of group 
counselling. 16 
An important aspect of the staff's interaction with 
the informal inmate world is the variety of informal 
bargaining arrangements that occur. This complex and 
dyn(!mic network of informal arrangements and bargains 
serve goals of control and maintenance. Several studies 
have pointed to staff strategies which have aided in 
developing and supporting an inmate elite with which 
staff is then able to bargain. McCleery comments that 
the purpose behind these arrangements is the mutual 
desire for peaceful and orderly conditions within 
which each group enjoyed its position of power. In an 
observational study of a cottage unit in a private 
reformatory, Howard Polsky has provided an outline of 
the phases of an accommodatory .process between cottage 
parents and the inmate elite. There was the period of 
reconnoitering and testing strengths, a transitional 
stage when certain orderly cottage routines were 
insisted on in exchange for an acceptance by the 
cottage parents of the inmate hierarchy. In the third 
phase the cottage parents took over, but this had to 
be done in a way that meshed in with the boys' own 
authoritarian organization.17 
The orientation of both staff and the inmate elite 
tends to be conservative with a high premium placed 
on the status quo. In his study of a military prison 
Richard Cloward suggests that accommodations are 
focused on material goods, power and prestige. His 
central thesis is that illegitimate opportunity 
structures are created to meet these ends and that the 
official system "plays a vital role in regulating 
the type of inmate roles that emerge, the social func-
tions they serve and the relationships between them. " 18 
He argues further: 
"Accommodation involves reciprocal expectations and obliga-
tions. If either party to the obligation fails to fulfill his 
part of the bargain the relationship is likely to deteriorate 
and break down. Each exercises a power over the other. nl 9 
Inmates in the elite "stand between the inmate system 
and the formal system, bridging them and binding them 
together. They mediate and modify the diverse pressures 
emanating from each system. They bring order to an 
otherwise strife-full situation." 2° Cloward con-
cludes that the inmate elite are the most important 
source of social control in the prison. 
Although these exchanges and reciprocal relation-
ships can achieve a certain level of control, or at 
least a surface placidity, they are inherently un-
stable. In his study of a federal prison, Ward found 
that "the reciprocity norm evident in both officer 
and inmate value systems is that the payoff is con-
tingent upon benefits received. However, the infla-
tionary spiral creates a continuous pressure for 
more benefits as any specific benefit loses value the 
more it becomes customary through regular usage." 21 
Sykes, McCleery and other students of the prison have 
drawn attention to the disturbing consequences that 
may follow the arrival of a reforming management in a 
situation where there has been some degree of stability 
in the informal bargaining arrangements. At a more 
official level there are a variety of bargaining 
arrangements focused around the pay-offs of length of 
time to be served and ease in living conditions. 
Sentences of an indeterminate or semi-indeterminate 
period of time are often important instruments for 
control, as are the wide range of living styles within 
the prison formalized by "honor" systems. 
There has been virtually no challenge within penal 
organizations to what might be called the prescriptive 
assumption. The assumption is that the inmate will 
benefit from staff interventions to put him right. The 
actual definitions used have varied from the crudely 
punitive to the highly sophisticated, but the organi-
zational role of the inmate has remained unchanged. 
The inmate has continued to be a passive recipient who 
plays virtually no part in shaping the definitions 
that are made about him or the activities that relate 
to him. The prescriptive assumption has survived despite 
the fact that no technology has been developed to 
support it. With a spate of recent research showing 
a nil result in controlled comparative studies, the 
era of Waiting for the Clinical Technology may be 
coming to an end.22 
In organizational terms, with treatment approaches to 
the inmate confirming his low status position, it is 
not surprising to find that the treatment ideology has 
left the modern prison virtually unchanged in its 
structure. LaMar Empey has commented: 
"The statuses of professional members of the organization, 
their helping roles, the powers they have to manipulate 
offenders depend upon the offender remaining in a subordinate 
position"23 
The analytical use of a continuum running from a treat-
ment to a custodial orientation has aided in the 
masking of basic similarities in structure between one 
organization and another. Many observers have, however, 
drawn attention to the phenomenon of displacement, 
whereby treatment methods are used to serve control 
goals. Personnel who may have been attracted into 
prison work in the first place because of a desire to 
apply professional skills in a treatment direction find 
that their time may well be spent on matters relating 
to control. 24 
One of the themes of modern penology has been the 
search for delinquent typologies and people-changing 
technologies to match. The key factor here, from an 
organizational perspective, is the low bargaining 
position of the inmate with his very limited oppor-
tunity to play a significant part in the actual treat-
ment situation as it affects him. This might be 
contrasted to the situation of a fee-paying patient 
meeting his doctor to discuss a psychosomatic com-
plaint. Balint has pointed out that despite what he 
calls the apostolic mission of the doctor, even he 
must take into account the offerings of the patient, 
and this means that eventually a negotiated definition 
of the illness is reached. 25 This is a very different 
situation from the minimal participation in diagnosis 
and treatment activities in the prison. The application 
within the penal setting of I-Level (Interpersonal 7 
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Maturity Level~ provides a recent example of minimal 
participation. 2 There have very occasionally 
been instances of inmates being involved within a 
contract-making situation as to their treatment pro-
gram but such contracts have been limited in scope and 
depth. 27 
In the absence of the emergence of a successful 
treatment technology there may be more attention given 
to structure rather than to technology, and there may 
in consequence be a greater tendency to look inside the 
prison, to staff and inmates, for suggestions as to 
how time might be most effectively spent. The focus 
may well come to be on new structural arrangements 
that would make for more meaningful activities within 
the prison and for the development of new linkages 
with the environment. 
The Happy-Family-Collaborative Model 
One hundred and fifty years ago William Roscoe 
suggested that "criminals should form a kind of 
community and should become in fact the reformers of 
each other." 28 It is however, only in the last two 
or three decades that there have been serious attempts 
to implement milieu therapy or similar approaches 
within the prison. These approaches towards developing 
a collaborative model were important for they repre-
sented a clear attempt to move away from the Caste-
Prescriptive structure. Milieu therapy is a very 
generic term, but in essence it refers to a belief 
that all interactions between people within the organi-
zation have a therapeutic potential. Most of the 
pioneer work was done within mental hospitals and 
within a variety of residential settings for 
children. 29 Democratic values are stressed, and 
milieu therapy has close links with the human relations 
school and with psychoanalysis. The developments that 
have occurred have generally been the results of field-
work, and there are only a few instances of systematic 
work in relation to theoretical design. 30 Milieu 
therapy within the prison setting has taken a wide 
variety of forms some of which follow directly from 
the work of Maxwell Jones: 31 large group meetings 
and guided group interaction. 32 The report of the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice 33 states: 
''The collaborative institution is structured around the 
partnership of all inmates and staff members in the process 
of rehabilitation." 
Although the report indicates that many prisons are 
moving in this direction there are very few reports of 
systematic structural change. 34 
These developments relating to milieu therapy in the 
prison have been important in a number of respects: 
a) in providing challenges to the prescriptive 
assumption; 
b) in drawing attention to many of the structural 
problems of the caste-prescriptive model (for example, 
the communication blockages within the organization); 
c) in challenging the notion that treatment is 
limited to specific events or relationships; 
d) in demonstrating that there are many untapped 
resources within staff and inmate groups; 
e) in drawing attention to the significance of 
organizational role definition for the inmate and staff. 
Jones called for a .drastic revision in existing staff 
and patient role relationships. Studt has written, 
"Seldom does the correctional organization manage to 
provide a basic role for the offenders it serves that 
defines them as persons of worth who have something to 
contribute to their society." 35 Milieu therapy de-
velopments have prompted considerable discussion about 
new forms of relationship between staff and inmates;36 
f) in developing, to some extent at least, a pro-
change value system. 
The collaborative model does however contain a number 
of serious limitations. First, there has been insuffi-
cient attention paid to the dominant operative goal of 
control. This has been as true of the mental hospital 
as of the prison, and in one study the authors found: 
"It is clear from the records that staff members (especially 
the director) used strategies in patient-staff meetings that 
maintained their power ... these strategies permitted a 
moralistic application of the therapeutic ideology which 
assumes staff domina.n_ce without seeming to do other than 
ignore and explore."37 
Second, the organization is often highly unstable, 
oscillating from periods of relaxation to tight control. 
Third, there is a tendency for the organization to be 
inward - rather than outward - looking. Fourth, inmate 
autonomy may be further reduced by participation in 
the therapeutic community. Jerome Frank, in his 
writings on psychotherapy, has suggested that it is 
more difficult to mobilize resistance - to a collabora-
tive than a directive therapist: 
"By failing to take a definite position the therapist 
deprives the pati~pt of a target against which he mobilizes 
his opposition."3!S 
Clear role distinctions would appear to be necessary 
both for the efficient functioning of the organization 
and in order to protect the inmate from losses in 
autonomy. One student of organizations has written: 
" .... without some organized protection of the client's 
autonomy neither the role of the professiom1l nor that of the 
client would be acceptable or permanent."3~ 
This threat to personal autonomy within the milieu 
therapy situation is brilliantly conveyed in Ken 
Kesey's novel One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest. 40 
It is of interest to note that in a recent survey of 
prisons in Europe it was found that in the six insti-
tutions that were described as having a milieu therapy 
base there were no inmate committees or other forms of 
formal inmate representation. 41 
Those who adhere to the collaborative model have 
been insufficiently aware of the organizational 
context. Their view of the prison as a unitary institu-
tion would appear to be particularly inappropriate. 
Alan Fox has been critical of those who have viewed 
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the industrial organization in this way: 
"If the enterprise were indeed unified by common purpose in 
a manner which made the team a valid analogy, then rallying 
cries would of course be in order, as would moral denuncia-
tions in appropriate circumstances. But if the enterprise is 
not of this structural nature then teamJJlythology may not only 
be irrelevant but positively harmfuJ."42 
Fox's suggestion that a pluralistic frame of reference 
would be more to the point is also true of the prison 
organization in modern Western society. In a further 
comment on the industrial organization Fox writes: 
" ... management has to face up to the fact that there are 
other sources of leadership, other focuses of loyalty within 
the social system it governs, and t!:iat it is with these that 
management must share its decision-making."43 
The Formal Bargaining Mode~ 
If the pluralistic frame of reference is valid for the 
prison it follows that an organizational model that 
allows for formal bargaining arrangements is worthy of 
exploration. Clearly there would be dangers in follow-
ing the industrial analogies too far, and such issues 
as recognition, legitimacy and rights have to be seen 
within a different context. The industrial situation 
can however serve a useful suggestive function. One of 
the few people to venture into this field is W. F. 
Whyte in his critical analysis of the milieu therapy 
basis of the Henderson Hospital. Whyte has written: 
"A labor relations model is superior to the community 
democracy model ... for it allows one to deal realistically 
with authority as well as with participation."44 
Whyte had been much impressed by Leighton's study of 
the Japanese-American relocation camp at Poston, 
Arizona, where there had been a gradual move from a 
pretended democracy to collective bargaining following 
inmate strikes. 45 The outlines of a formal bar-
gaining model presented here represent an attempt at 
developing a workable alternative to the caste-
prescriptive and collaborative models. 
The rationale for the formal bargaining model consists 
of: 
a) the existence of a number of informal bargaining 
bases that relate to the organization's goals of 
control, maintenance and betterment of inmates. The 
likelihood is that staff are dependent upon inmate 
cooperation (if not active participation) for the 
achievement of any one of these goals; 
b) the resources of the prison and its environment 
are more likely to be put to full use; 
c) a higher level of inmate and staff commit-
ment to inmate betterment will be achieved as a result 
of shared decision-making; 
d) there will be a greater overall clarification 
of organizational issues and less opportunity for 
collusion or double bind to occur; 
e) inmate needs can be met formally and openly; 
f) conflict will be institutionalized rather 
than emerging in violent eruptions. 
Among the key theoretical issues are inmate bargain-
ing power and the granting of legitimacy by other 
groups to collective actions by inmates that place the 
inmates in a position from which they can openly 
negotiate. It is not possible to make generalizations 
about inmate bargaining power. Among the determinants 
of the strength of bargaining power are the level of 
dependency of the organization on inmate cooperation to 
reaiize its goals and the degree of inmate solidarity. 
These two issues are inter-connected. Thomas Mathieson, 
a Norwegian sociologist with a special interest in 
this area, has argued that the essentially non-
contributory role of the inmate leads to a situation 
where there is a general pointlessness to solidarity. 
Mathiesen comments, 
"The feeling of not being unable to contribute leads not only 
to the view that one cannot threaten the system; it also leads 
to the feeline: that one cannot actively improve the 
system."46 
Mathiesen, however, appears to underestimate the signi-
ficance of the move towards industrialized prisons, the 
high level of inmate participation involved in meeting 
the maintenance goal, the sensitivity of prison staff 
and penal agencies to internal disorder and an in-
creasing recognition that the prescriptive approaches 
have been unsuccessful. Further factors of vital im-
portance are the coalitions and alliances with groups 
that are external to the prison. Bargaining arrange-
ments within the prison will not exist in a vacuum but 
are likely to be closely intertwined with a variety of 
what Lloyd Ohlin calls correctional interest groups. 
Of crucial significance in the creation of bargaining 
bases will be the role of third parties, whether 
in the form of legislation, court rulings or aspects 
of public opinion. 
Some recent developments in Sweden underline the sig-
nificance of the external contacts. In common with 
other Scandinavian countries Sweden has during the 
last three years seen the growth of inmate unions 
which are closely allied to student and radical groups 
in the community. Inmate councils in Swedish prisons 
have affiliations to KRUM, a national organization 
that has brought together in its membership ex-
prisoners and academics and which has established 
positive links with the mass media. A series of sit-
down and hunger strikes began in 1969 in many Swedish 
prisons and led to central negotiations taking place 
between the National Correctional Administration, the 
staff unions, representatives of inmate councils in the 
prisons and KRUM. The Administration has not challenged 
the inmates' right to form inmate councils in each 
prison and for these to keep in touch with each other. 
The Director General of the National Correctional 
Administration in a recent survey of these develop-
ments commented: 
"Regardless of what associations might exist among the 
inmates, it was seen as important, however, to find new 
organizational forms for the consulation process through 
which the various personnel categories and inmates could 
feel shared responsibility for the efforts." 
9 
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Later in the same paper he noted that the inmate 
councils settled issues which otherwise would have 
caused unrest or confrontation. He concluded that the 
negotiating machinery established has "placed on 
equal footing the delegates of the country's 5000 
prisoners on the one side and representatives of the 
correctional authorities and personnel organizations 
on the other. "4 7 Swedish public opinion has clearly 
played an instrumental role in enabling the authorities 
to recognize the right of prisoners to negotiate about 
prison conditions. The civil status and rights of 
those imprisoned will be strongly associated with the 
manner in which recognition and legitimacy is achieved. 
Chamberlain has underlined the essence of collective 
bargaining within industry: 
"The great change which takes place is the creation of two 
organizations, each of which in one sense is independent of 
the other but are likewise mutually dependent, so that for 
each the achievement of its own function is dependent upon 
the other. ,,4g 
The outlines of the model presented in this paper are 
limited to aspects arising from an internal perspective 
of the organization. The variety of links wit.h the 
environment, including the department of corrections 
are not considered here. The model emerges as a result 
of viewing the prison within a pluralistic frame of 
reference which acknowledges that there are several 
sources of power and distinct interest groups within 
the prison. Conflict is recognized as inevitable, but 
not beyond the possibility of institutionalization. 
Inmate autonomy with certain areas is granted legiti-
macy. The Formal Bargaining model focuses on staff-
inmate negotiations in relation to the ease and the 
use of time. The model is not concerned with the 
length of time to be served. It is assumed that this is 
predetermined externally and is not negotiable. 
The Ease of Time 
Many of the exchanges that take place will be con-
cerned with matters pertaining to living conditions 
within the prison. In Walton and McKersie's terminology 
this would fall under the category of "distributive" 
social negotiations. 49 Here the bargaining is con-
cerned with the distribution of resources and with the 
possibilities of increasing the total volume of 
resources available. Formal negotiating machinery 
organized around living units but providing for central 
agreements which affect the prison as a whole will be 
necessary. Highly centralized procedures are unlikely, 
on the whole, to be appropriate, and the rather less 
formal arrangements within the living unit will be of 
greater significance. Informal bargaining is likely 
to continue to be of considerable importance. The 
focus of the negotiations conducted in Sweden has been 
on the ease of time. The model assumes that staff 
assumptions about inmate use of time will not be 
heavily built into the organizational structure. The 
organization remains flexible enough to allow for 
negotiation about how time might be used. That is not 
to say that management and staff should not have views 
but that these views should not be given unchallenged 
precedence. The negotiations in relation to the use of 
time will, in Walton and McKersie's terms, be of 
mainly an "integrative" nature, together with ele-
ments of what they call "attitudinal structuring." 50 
Management and staff are likely to give some priority 
to maintenance and production goals of the prison. 
Inmates may well focus on leisure uses of time. As far 
as using the time in ways that might enhance inmate 
betterment, especially in relation to the improvement 
of the chances of avoiding further recidivism, there 
are likely to be a number of conflicting assumptions. 
The bargaining will attempt to reach normative 
concensus. 
The formal process adopted within any one prison will 
require flexibility so that it can be quickly adapted 
to changing circumstances. The nature of the relation-
ship between inmate and staff groups cannot be deter-
mined by fiat. Within the prison the relationship will 
have a dynamic quality and from time to time will 
reflect elements of conflict, accommodation, collu-
sion and cooperation. The bargaining relationships 
will pass through states of development and the 
inevitable oscillations will reflect attempts at 
conflict and joint goal-planning. Neither the relation-
ships nor the agreements are likely to be static for 
long. Wellington has written: 
"A collective bargaining agreement (however) is one episode 
of a continuous joint history of a firm and union. Itis a . 
temporary calm in a restless shifting relationship. "51 
The negotiating arrangements in relation to the ease 
and use of time will have to be continually adapted 
with local and central arrangements varying in their 
importance within the organization. It might, for 
example, be that matters relating to use of time will 
be settled by cohort groups of inmates with certain 
staff, and that through separate procedures inmate 
representatives would take part in determining matters 
relating to living conditions. 
The Formal Bargaining model, whatever its specific 
shape, would appear to provide a workable alternative 
to the organizational models reviewed earlier. In 
particular the model provides for: 
a) clarity as to what the organizational issues are; 
b) conflict resolution procedures of an adaptable 
nature which are built into the organization's 
structure; 
c) the opportunity for commitment to develop by 
both inmate and staff groups to betterment programs 
where there has been a joint decision on starting 
definitions, and a joint endeavour to carry the 
agreement through; 
d) a more efficient use of resources; 
e) a likelihood that there will be increasing 
linkages with parts of the environment conducive to 
keeping the inmate out of prison after his release; 
f) protection of areas of autonomy through formal 
arrangements for the various groups within the prison; 
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g) the emergence of a new form of relationship 
between staff and inmates that replaces that asso-
ciated with a caste society or a "happy family." 
The model is consistent with an increasingly 
pluralistic society, and although it might appear to 
imply a rather unusual process of power devolution, 
it would seem likely that there will be increased 
demands by various groups within and external to the 
prison for a share of decision-making. These demands 
are likely to find expression in a complex of alliances 
between prisoners and external groups, with an in-
creasing interest taken by the courts in matters 
within the prison. By providing.for both the ease and 
use of time the model is something of a synthesis of 
penal reform and penal practice. While it does not 
challenge the basic issue of imprisonment itself, its 
organizational implications would make a profouna 
impact on the prison as existing in contemporary 
Western society. 
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